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 When I did ethnographic research with young, predominantly North African-origin 
Parisian Jews in the mid-2000s, I found something that few historians or social scientists were 
expecting.  In contrast to previous generations of French Jews, many of the young people I got to 
know saw Frenchness and Jewishness as mutually exclusive categories of belonging.  In fact, 
calling someone français [French] in certain French Jewish milieu had replaced the use of the 
word goy, suggesting that Frenchness increasingly indexed an ethno-religious as well as national 
content for young Jews.  As I show in my book Rhinestones, Religion and the Republic: 
Fashioning Jewishness in France,1 this sense that Frenchness and Jewishness were no longer 
cumulative identities had quite a bit to do with the way some French Jews—most particularly 
those from North Africa, rather than longer established Ashkenazim—experienced and 
understood rising French anti-Semitism, French politics vis-à-vis Israel, and their own diasporic 
Israeli identities.  For many North African Jews, the wider French public’s inability to 
understand Israel and European Jews’ linked vulnerabilities vis-à-vis rising “Arab” or “Muslim” 
anti-Semitism signaled the incommensurable difference between French Jews and “the French.”  
In some ways, Israel divided Jews from Frenchness. 
For some French Jewish elites committed to maintaining the storied link between Jews 
and France, this created a difficult situation.  The early 2000s marked the beginning of what 
many French political pundits have called the le Penisation des esprits, a term that uses the last 
name of the far right Front National’s leaders (father and daughter Jean-Marie and Marine Le 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Kimberly	  Arkin,	  Rhinestones,	  Religion,	  and	  the	  Republic:	  Fashioning	  Jewishness	  in	  France	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2014).	  
Pen) to signal the colonization of mainstream politics by hard right understandings of national 
identity, immigration, and even secularism.  At the time, the French government was working to 
control public expressions of religion—banning the veil and the kippah from public schools; 
organizing a national body to officially “represent” Muslims—while calling for public debates 
about national identity and belonging.  Although Muslims were clearly more at risk of being 
“denationalized” in this context, many French Jewish elites also found themselves forced to 
insist that Jewish Frenchness was unproblematic, particularly in contrast to Muslim foreignness.2  
The disconnect that many young North African French Jews and their parents3 felt from France 
over the linked issues of anti-Semitism and Israel threatened this attempt to frame Jewish identity 
and Frenchness as a powerful foil for young Muslim alterity.   
In this article, I explore some of the conflicting Jewish discourses about Israel and French 
anti-Semitism that have emerged in the shadows cast by this threat of “denationalization.”  I look 
at discourses from French Jewish intellectuals, national Jewish organizations, and the Jewish 
press from the mid-2000s until after the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks. Anti-
Semitism changed quite dramatically over the course of this period and yet was persistently 
characterized by many elite Jews as remaining the same.  But while often denying that anti-
Semitism had empirically changed, Jewish discourse itself shifted.  In the early 2000s, many 
Jewish accounts of French anti-Semitism worked (in often internally contradictory ways) to 
disconnect French anti-Semitism from the conflict in Israel/Palestine.  After 2012—as Islamist 
attacks augmented theft-driven, street corner anti-Semitism—some accounts of anti-Semitism 
made Israel the key to understanding anti-Semitic violence.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  a	  clear	  statement	  of	  this	  fear	  of	  “denationalization,”	  see	  further	  Shmuel	  Trigano,	  La	  démission	  de	  la	  
République:	  juifs	  et	  musulmans	  en	  France	  (Paris:	  Presses	  Universitaires	  de	  France,	  2003).	  3	  Often	  parents	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  made	  “aware”	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  French	  Jewishness	  through	  their	  children’s	  experiences	  and	  stories,	  see	  further	  Arkin,	  Rhinestones,	  Religion,	  and	  the	  Republic..	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Why this shift in discourse and the simultaneous denial of its empirical roots?  Why insist 
that everything had remained the same and yet tell a somewhat different story about what was 
happening?  And what, if anything, might tracing out the relationship between discourse about 
and empirical manifestations of anti-Semitism teach those of us who are writing and thinking 
about contemporary anti-Semitism?  I will argue that in a political context where Israel is often 
publicly read (and denounced) as a continuation of failed and violent settler colonialism—
notably as instantiated in Algeria—Jewish accounts of anti-Semitism in the early 2000s often 
worked very hard to divorce French anti-Semitism from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
(post)colonial racism in France.  Post-2012, some Jewish commentators saw a way of divorcing 
Israel from such a colonial reading, notably by linking Israel’s struggle against terrorism, on the 
one hand, and French Jews’ struggles with anti-Semitism, on the other, to a wider civilizational 
battle against Islam.  At the same time, the discursive denial that anything about the empirical 
reality of anti-Semitism had changed helped buttress the claim that attacks against Jews—
whether in France or Israel—had never been a “weapon of the weak,”4 but rather the tactic of a 
powerful and perverse enemy.  While this new discursive approach seemed to resolve some of 
the issues associated with Jewish belonging in contemporary France, it created others—
particularly for North African Jews whose understandings of Muslim-Jewish relations were 
grounded in the experience or memory of colonial relations in North Africa.  As I will suggest in 
the conclusion, discursive wrangling over anti-Semitism may thus be as much about complex 
affective negotiations of belonging as about the “facts” of anti-Semitism themselves.  And this 
may be an important lesson for social scientists interested in anti-Semitism. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  James	  C.	  Scott,	  Weapons	  of	  the	  Weak:	  Everyday	  Forms	  of	  Peasant	  Resistance	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  
Anti-Semitism in the Early 2000s 
The beginning of the Second Palestinian Intifada in the early 2000s brought a dramatic 
increase in anti-Semitic incidents and Jewish fear of anti-Semitism to France.  Between 1999 and 
2004, documented acts of anti-Semitism increased 10 fold, from about 100 acts in 1999 to almost 
1000 in 2004.5  The actual incidents labeled as anti-Semitic were diverse.  During this period, 
Jewish cemeteries were vandalized and Jewish institutions attacked; anti-Semitic graffiti 
appeared on walls, in elevators, and on synagogues; wallets and cellphones were stolen as 
assailants verbally insulted victims; and there was also physical violence, including the horrific 
kidnapping, torture and murder of Ilan Halimi in January 2006.6  
Serious empirical work on this new post-2000s anti-Semitism suggested that motivations 
for these various incidents were complex and sometimes divergent.7  Traditional far-right 
stereotypes and grievances continued to inspire some anti-Jewish acts.  At the same time, some 
second and third generation North African (and to a lesser extent, sub-Saharan African) Muslims 
expressed their economic and social resentments through anti-Semitism, particularly against 
Jewish youth of North African origin.  For example, in the mid-2000s, a high school student left 
her observant Jewish day school in a working class Parisian suburb for lunch.  She was dressed 
in recognizably “Jewish” fashion,8 and while she was waiting for the bus to return to school, she 
claimed that two 20 year olds accosted her, asked her for money, and then demanded her credit 
cards.  When she said that she did not have credit cards, they slapped her and called her a “sale 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Commission	  nationale	  consultative	  des	  droits	  de	  l’homme,	  “La	  lutte	  contre	  le	  racisme,	  l’antisémitisme	  et	  la	  xénophobie,”	  Press	  release	  (Paris:	  CNCDH,	  2015).	  6	  UEJF	  and	  SOS-­‐Racisme,	  Les	  Antifeujs:	  le	  livre	  blanc	  des	  violences	  antisémites	  en	  France	  depuis	  septembre	  2000	  (Paris:	  Calmann-­‐Lévy,	  2002);	  Shmuel	  Trigano,	  “Les	  Juifs	  de	  France	  visés	  par	  l’Intifada?,”	  Observatoire	  du	  
monde	  juif,	  November	  2001;	  Commission	  nationale	  consultative	  des	  droits	  de	  l’homme,	  “La	  lutte	  contre	  le	  racisme,	  l’antisémitisme	  et	  la	  xénophobie.”	  7	  Michel	  Wieviorka	  and	  Philippe	  Bataille,	  La	  tentation	  antisémite:	  haine	  des	  Juifs	  dans	  la	  France	  d’aujourd’hui	  (Paris:	  Laffont,	  2005).	  8	  Kimberly	  Arkin,	  “Rhinestone	  Aesthetics	  and	  Religious	  Essence:	  Looking	  Jewish	  in	  Paris,”	  American	  
Ethnologist	  36,	  no.	  4	  (2009):	  722–34.	  
juive” [dirty Jew].  I heard or read about scores and scores of such incidents in the early 2000s.  
These kinds of encounters suggested that North African Jewish children, who often hailed from 
upwardly mobile families but lived in very diverse working class neighborhoods, were seen as 
proximate targets for other immigrant-origin youth living in the same neighborhoods.  North 
African Jewish youth were both similar to and different from other immigrant-origin youth 
because of their relative class and social mobility; young Jews therefore symbolized both the 
promise of French republican assimilation and its impossibility for other kinds of immigrants, 
notably Muslims.9  On top of these proximate social and economic grievances, the violent 
ethnicization of both Jews and Muslims through the Israeli-Palestinian conflict led some 
adolescents and young adults to lash out against Jews-as-Israelis (and even some young Jews to 
lash out against Muslims-as-Palestinians).10 
But for many French Jews, such accounts of the complexity and non-“Islamic” nature of 
post-2000s anti-Semitism were at best incomplete and misleading, at worst dangerous.  
Frustrated by the French government’s initial refusal to address or even talk about anti-
Semitism,11 many French Jews and some French intellectuals (both Jewish and non-Jewish) 
quickly developed an alternative narrative about early 2000s anti-Semitism.  This narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Arkin,	  Rhinestones,	  Religion,	  and	  the	  Republic;	  Maud	  Mandel,	  Muslims	  and	  Jews	  in	  France:	  History	  of	  a	  Conflict	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2014).	  10	  Again	  just	  one	  example	  among	  many:	  Sarah,	  a	  high	  school	  student	  in	  a	  Jewish	  school	  in	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  explained	  that	  when	  “Arabs	  see	  Jews,	  they	  immediately	  think	  the	  Jew	  is	  killing	  little	  Palestinian	  children.”	  	  A	  friend	  of	  Sarah’s,	  who	  was	  listening	  to	  our	  conversation,	  added	  her	  own	  anecdote,	  noting	  that	  a	  man	  had	  come	  up	  to	  her	  in	  a	  public	  place	  and	  asked	  if	  she	  was	  Jewish,	  probably	  because	  she	  was	  wearing	  a	  Jewish	  star.	  	  When	  she	  said	  yes,	  the	  man	  asked	  her	  to	  tell	  her	  “brothers	  in	  Israel	  to	  stop	  killing	  Palestinians.”	  11	  In	  early	  2002,	  center-­‐right	  President	  Jacques	  Chirac	  denied	  that	  France	  was	  either	  “anti-­‐Semitic”	  or	  even	  experiencing	  a	  significant	  wave	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism,	  see	  further	  Jérémy	  Sebbane,	  “Le	  début	  d’une	  grande	  alyah ?	  Les	  Juifs	  de	  France	  ‘montés’	  en	  Israël	  depuis	  2000,”	  Archives	  Juives	  41,	  no.	  2	  (2008):	  87–100;	  “Antisémitisme:	  Chirac	  ‘choqué’	  par	  les	  propos	  d’Israël,”	  Aujourd’hui	  Le	  Maroc,	  February	  28,	  2002..	  	  In	  addition,	  Chirac’s	  Socialist	  Prime	  Minister,	  Lionel	  Jospin,	  refused	  to	  address	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  new	  wave	  of	  anti-­‐Semitism,	  preferring	  instead	  to	  condemn	  racism	  more	  generally,	  see	  further	  Trigano,	  “Les	  Juifs	  de	  France	  visés	  par	  l’Intifada?”	  
distinguished it from older French variants—it was referred to as the “new anti-Semitism”12—
and linked it to a supposedly old and global story of Muslim hatred for Jews.13  In this narrative, 
Israel and Israeli politics served as an excuse for Muslim anti-Semitism, a way of masking 
racialized hatred through a discourse of anti-Zionism.  As a result, it was incorrect to argue that 
the post-2000 rise in anti-Semitism was “caused” by the conflict in Israel-Palestine, let alone by 
socio-economic conditions and exclusions in France. 	  Instead, in this discourse, violent “Muslim” 
reactivity to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a symptom of a deeper reality, notably Muslim 
intolerance of and/or hatred for Jews, as well as “Arab” incompatibility with Western 
democracy.14  Here I would like to provide just a few examples of this kind of reasoning, from 
dramatically different social locations.  In 2004, an unemployed, Moroccan-born Jewish father of 
two explained to me that what had happened between Jews and Muslim in colonial and post-
colonial Morocco was happening again in France.  “Jews and Muslims have never gotten along, 
for obvious reasons,” he explained.  For this man, not only does an “Arab” see a Zionist every 
time he looks at a Jew, but the Qu’ran encourages Muslims to “hate Jews…  In Morocco you 
couldn’t wear a kippah in the street because they would come after you with stones; they’ve just 
restarted the whole thing in France.”  The French Jewish philosopher Shmuel Trigano’s 
extensive commentary on the “new” anti-Semitism is similar, but written with greater tact and 
sophistication.  Trigano, an Algerian-born Jewish intellectual who issued some of the first calls 
to denounce public silence around post-2000 anti-Semitism, wrote in 2002 that the rise in anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  For	  a	  very	  useful	  critique	  of	  and	  engagement	  with	  this	  concept,	  see	  further	  Jonathan	  Judaken,	  “So	  What’s	  New?	  	  Rethinking	  the	  ‘New	  Antisemitism’	  in	  a	  Global	  Age,”	  Patterns	  of	  Prejudice	  42,	  no.	  4–5	  (2008)..	  13	  See	  further,	  Emmanuel	  Brenner,	  Les	  territoires	  perdus	  de	  la	  République:	  antisémitisme,	  racisme	  et	  sexisme	  en	  
milieu	  scolaire	  (Paris:	  Mille	  et	  une	  nuits,	  2002);	  Emmanuel	  Brenner,	  France,	  prends	  garde	  de	  perdre	  ton	  âme:	  
Fracture	  sociale	  et	  antisémitisme	  dans	  la	  république	  (Paris:	  Mille	  et	  une	  nuits,	  2004);	  Alain	  Finkielkraut,	  Au	  
nom	  de	  l’autre:	  réflexions	  sur	  l’antisémitisme	  qui	  vient	  (Paris:	  Gallimard,	  2003);	  Shmuel	  Trigano,	  “Les	  victimes	  des	  « victimes	  des	  victimes »,”	  Pardès	  34,	  no.	  1	  (August	  1,	  2003):	  377–99;	  Trigano,	  La	  démission	  de	  la	  
République.	  14	  See	  further,	  Pierre-­‐André	  Taguieff,	  La	  nouvelle	  judéophobie	  ([Paris]:	  Mille	  et	  une	  nuits,	  2002).	  
Unknown
Field Code Changed
Semitism in France was not tied to an ethnicized conflict between two “communities” with 
conflicting foreign allegiances.  Instead, it was the result of a specific religious and political 
ideology:   
Viewed in these terms, a serious problem arises, notably knowing where Islam 
ends and Islamism starts.  We personally hope that this is a real distinction…  
Courageous interventions like those of the Grand Mosque’s rector Dalil 
Boubakeur help immensely.  We hope he is articulating the perspective of French 
Islam, despite the fact that what happens in schools, on the radio, and on the 
internet… leaves us fearful that anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism are widely shared 
in Muslim opinion… 15.   
 
For Trigano, this proximity between “Islam” and anti-Judaism, plus the seemingly indiscriminate 
attacks on Jews or people who “look Jewish” in France, seemed to be a sign “of the disturbingly 
endemic character of this anti-Semitism, which has come from a universe that has remained 
foreign to 50 years of changes in Europe and which is redolent with archaic 19th century 
images.”16   Like the father cited above, and despite his elaborate rhetorical hedging, Trigano 
clearly thinks of Islam as lending itself to violent Islamism; he also assumes that “Islam” is 
inherently non-Western, non-modern and a major vehicle for Jewish hatred.17  By 2015, 
Trigano’s language had become less careful.  Reflecting on the entire post-2000s history of anti-
Semitism in France, he wrote:  
Behind the pretext of Palestine, the religious motivations of the anti-Jewish 
violence remain misunderstood.  It would cost French elites too much doctrinal 
and psychological effort to accept this fact, after such a long period of denial, for it 
overturns their erroneous prism of interpretation.  The thesis that France faces an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Shmuel	  Trigano,	  “L’islamisme	  et	  les	  Juifs:	  un	  test	  pour	  la	  République,”	  Observatoire	  du	  monde	  juif,	  December	  2002,	  1.	  16	  Trigano,	  1.	  17	  It	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  that	  around	  this	  same	  time,	  some	  revisionist	  histories	  about	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  began	  to	  appear	  in	  French.	  	  I	  have	  written	  more	  extensively	  about	  this	  elsewhere	  Kimberly	  Arkin,	  “Temprality,	  Peoplehood,	  and	  Politics:	  Holocaust	  Talk	  in	  21st	  Century	  France,”	  Comparative	  Studies	  in	  
Society	  and	  History,	  forthcoming.	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  note	  that	  sometimes	  these	  accounts	  suggest	  that	  if	  the	  Allies	  had	  not	  landed	  in	  Tunisia	  when	  they	  did,	  the	  “Arab”	  populations	  of	  North	  Africa	  would	  have	  helped	  the	  Nazi	  occupier	  murder	  Jews	  en	  masse,	  just	  as	  Eastern	  European	  populations	  had	  helped	  murder	  Ashkenazim.	  	  See	  further,	  George	  Bensoussan,	  Juifs	  en	  pays	  Arabes,	  1850-­‐1975	  (Paris:	  Tallendier,	  2012);	  Claude	  Nataf,	  ed.,	  Les	  
Juifs	  de	  Tunisie	  sous	  le	  joug	  nazi	  (Paris:	  Editions	  le	  Manuscrit,	  2012).	  
‘imported conflict’ still reigns today—and it remains as false now as it was 14 
years ago at the time of the Second Intifada.  We are in the same place.18 
 
 
 In some ways, this attempt to disassociate Israel from mid-2000s anti-Semitism in France 
“renationalized” Jews.  Understanding anti-Semitism as an intrinsically “Muslim” problem 
suggested that Jews were French in ways foreclosed to Muslims.  This version of the story 
refused the conflation of Jews with Israelis, insisting instead that if Jews were being attacked as 
Jews it was in fact the French Republic and its secular, non-ethnicized vision of the nation as a 
voluntary political community that was the real target.  Anti-Semitism thus functioned like the 
proverbial canary in the mine, indicating when the noxious gases of alternative political 
ideologies like ethno-nationalism or Islamism threatened the race-blind, assimilationist Republic.   
This is clear in the slogans chanted by members of the UEJF during a 2004 demonstration 
against anti-Semitism: “synagogues brulées, République en danger” [burned synagogues mean 
the Republic is in danger] or “juifs agressés, République en danger” [attacking Jews is an attack 
on the Republic].  Or, as an intellectual like Alain Finkielkraut noted, “hatred of the French is 
spreading just like hatred of the Jews, and is becoming indistinguishable.”19	   In its most general 
form, this argument saw the targeting of Jews as the forerunner to and sign of a general war 
against “the West” and its democratic and civilizational values.   
In addition, disassociating anti-Semitism from Israel helped deflect attention from the 
political divide between many French Jews and the wider French public.  As Michel Feher has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Shmuel	  Trigano,	  “A	  Journey	  Through	  French	  Anti-­‐Semitism,”	  Jewish	  Reivew	  of	  Books,	  Spring	  2015.	  19	  Agence	  France	  Press,	  “Finkielkraut,	  Kouchner,	  Taguieff,	  Ghableb	  Bencheikh	  signent	  un	  appel	  contre	  les	  ‘ratonnades	  anti-­‐blancs,’”	  Agence	  France	  Presse,	  March	  25,	  2005.	  	  See	  also	  Georges	  Bensoussan’s	  work	  under	  the	  pseudonym	  Emmanuel	  Brenner	  which	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  about	  the	  proximity	  between	  anti-­‐French	  and	  anti-­‐Jewish	  racism	  Brenner,	  France,	  prends	  garde	  de	  perdre	  ton	  âme,	  Part	  I.	  
noted,20 in the wider French public and French political sphere, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
often understood through a colonial framework.  This framework is heavily influenced both by 
what Todd Shepard has called “the invention of decolonization”21 and by Marxist approaches to 
social relations.  From this perspective, Israel is seen as not having learned the lesson of the 
French Algerian war.  Instead, in Israel-Palestine, an invader population continues to dominate, 
oppress and control an autochthonous regional majority.  As a retired school teacher sputtered in 
the summer of 2016 when he found out that I worked on Jews in France: “One day they are 
going to have to learn to stop colonizing Palestine.”   
This particular framework has two effects on Jews.  First, it highlights one of the very few 
contemporary political issues where “Arab Muslim” populations are more closely aligned with 
mainstream French politics and sensibilities than are Jews.  If Jewish discourses about “Muslim” 
anti-Semitism highlight the cultural alterity of French Muslims, understanding Israel through a 
colonial framework emphasizes the political alterity of French Jews.22  In a sense then, a colonial 
reading of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also denationalizes French Jews, highlighting their 
inability to participate in what is otherwise a very wide-ranging political consensus.   
Second, a colonial reading of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has an impact on the way 
power relations between French Jews and Muslims are understood.  Many French Jews 
increasingly see themselves as an isolated minority threatened by “Arab Muslims” both in 
France and on a more global scale.  In the early 2000s, when the mainstream press emphasized 
Israel’s disproportionate power and therefore responsibility vis-à-vis the Palestinians, many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  “Le	  Proche-­‐Orient	  hors	  les	  murs.	  	  Usages	  français	  du	  conflit	  israélo-­‐palestinien,”	  in	  De	  la	  question	  sociale	  à	  
la	  question	  raciale,	  ed.	  Didier	  Fassin	  and	  Eric	  Fassin	  (Paris:	  La	  Découverte,	  2006),	  91–105.	  21	  The	  Invention	  of	  Decolonization:	  The	  Algerian	  War	  and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  France	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  Univ.	  Press,	  2008).	  22	  Kimberly	  Arkin,	  “Defining	  France	  and	  Defending	  Israel:	  Romantic	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  Paradoxes	  of	  French	  Jewish	  Belonging,”	  in	  Re-­‐Examining	  the	  Jews	  of	  Modern	  France:	  Images	  and	  Identities	  (Boston:	  Brill,	  2016).	  
French Jews saw only Israel’s fragility.  A Jewish school that I worked in during the early 2000s 
had a poster in the lunchroom that encapsulated this worldview.  On a map Israel was 
represented as a handful of blue soldiers wearing Jewish stars surrounded by a sea of green 
soldiers wearing Islamic crescents.  The map made no distinction between, for example, Turkey, 
a non-Arab country with, at the time, perfectly cordial diplomatic relations with Israel, and Syria, 
a country against which Israel was periodically in a violent proxy war.  As a result, the map 
figured the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not as a territorial or even political war between Israelis 
and Palestinians, or even Israelis and “Arabs,” but rather as a religious war between a tiny Jewish 
population and a vast, multinational and even ethnic Muslim world.  Other variants of this kind 
of imaginary pitted “Arabs,” a designation that in France refers almost interchangeably to an 
ethno-geographical and religious identity, against Jews and Israelis.  When the pro-Israel foreign 
affairs specialist Frédéric Encel came to speak in a Parisian Jewish day school about Israel-
Palestine, he gently mocked his audience for the way they linked geopolitics to “Arabness.”  He 
opened by telling them that he already “knew” what they thought about the conflict:  
There are 300 million Arabs in the world [willing to fight Israel.]… First, no 
no,…there are fewer.  It’s not true.  There are 280 million Arabs….  And then, I 
don’t see why all Arabs would be viscerally concerned with the [Israeli-
Palestinian] problem, notably our friends the Mauritanians [who vote for Israel at 
the United Nations].  But [you say], around Israel there is this mass, this mass…  
Morocco, Algerian, Tunisia, Chad…  Oh but wait, they are not around Israel.  It 
doesn’t make any sense to include them in this sort of power relation…  To say 
that in [19]73 Morocco officially went to war with Israel, what did they do? 
 
In other words, both the map and Encel pointed in different ways to a wide-spread, 
visceral sense among many Jews that Israel and Jews more generally were going to be 
devoured by (interchangeably) anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli Arab Muslim hordes. 
 In contrast to this sense of Jewish endangerment, a colonial reading of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict facilitates a post-colonial reading of the relative status of Jews and Muslims 
in France, one that reverses the power relations revealed by both the map and Encel’s comments.  
Most of the contemporary French Jewish population either hails from, or is a direct descendant 
of someone who hails from, North Africa.  During the colonial period, French colonial policies 
and Metropolitan Jewish organizations encouraged the Frenchification and upward mobility of 
many—although certainly not all—North African Jews.23  In addition, in the years following 
decolonization, legal status and forms of habitus acquired in the colonies, as well as the 
concerted effort of Metropolitan Jewish organizations, facilitated the social integration and 
upward mobility of North African Jews who emigrated to the Metropole.24  As a result, although 
the social conditions of French Jews are as diverse as the population itself, Jews overall exceed 
French population averages in measures like general education level and white collar 
employment.25  In contrast, similar indicators among Muslims from North Africa paint a portrait 
of a population that dramatically trails French averages in education level, income, and rates of 
employment.26  In other words, reading contemporary French anti-Semitism through a post-
colonial lens suggests that it is a “weapon of the weak,”27 an attempt on the part of a fragile and 
excluded population to avenge itself against the practices of the French state and a group 
imagined as unfairly benefiting from those practices.28  And although this anti-Semitism may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  for	  example,	  André	  Chouraqui,	  L’histoire	  des	  Juifs	  en	  Afrique	  du	  Nord	  (Paris:	  Hachette,	  1985);	  Michael	  Laskier,	  The	  Alliance	  Universelle	  and	  the	  Jewish	  Communities	  of	  Morocco:	  1862-­‐1962	  (SUNY	  Press,	  1983);	  Joshua	  Schreier,	  Arabs	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Faith	  the	  Civilizing	  Mission	  in	  Colonial	  Algeria	  (New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2010);	  Todd	  Shepard,	  “Algerian	  Nationalism,	  Zionism,	  and	  French	  Laïcité:	  A	  History	  of	  Ethnoreligious	  Nationalisms	  and	  Decolonization,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  45,	  no.	  3	  (August	  2013):	  445–67;	  Shepard,	  The	  Invention	  of	  Decolonization.	  	  For	  a	  counter	  example,	  see	  Sarah	  Abrevaya	  Stein,	  Saharan	  Jews	  and	  the	  Fate	  of	  French	  Algeria	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2014).	  24	  Ethan	  Katz,	  The	  Burdens	  of	  Brotherhood:	  Jews	  and	  Muslims	  from	  North	  Africa	  to	  France	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2015);	  Mandel,	  Muslims	  and	  Jews	  in	  France:	  History	  of	  a	  Conflict.	  25	  Erik	  Cohen,	  Les	  juifs	  de	  France:	  valeurs	  et	  identité	  (Paris:	  Fonds	  Social	  Juif	  Unifié,	  2002).	  26	  Jonathan	  Laurence,	  The	  Emancipation	  of	  Europe’s	  Muslims:	  The	  State’s	  Role	  in	  Minority	  Integration	  (Princeton,	  N.J:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2012);	  Jonathan	  Laurence	  and	  Justin	  Vaisse,	  Integrating	  Islam :	  
Political	  and	  Religious	  Challenges	  in	  Contemporary	  France	  (Washington,	  DC,	  USA:	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2005).	  27	  Scott,	  Weapons	  of	  the	  Weak.	  28	  Mandel,	  Muslims	  and	  Jews	  in	  France:	  History	  of	  a	  Conflict.	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have significant consequences for a small number of individuals, it cannot be seen as threatening 
the relatively privileged social and political standing of French Jews.29 
For many French Jews, such a point of view encapsulates the incommensurability 
between “French” and “Jewish” sensibilities.  As a result, some French discourses work to 
decouple discussions of Israel and anti-Semitism from conversations about political and social 
domination.  Behind closed doors some Jewish intellectuals made fun of their Jewish audiences 
in the mid-2000s for their “irrational” ideas about both French Jewish and Israeli fragility, 
insisting “entre nous” [among ourselves] that it was far better to be Jewish than to be Muslim in 
France.  In addition, as we can hear in Encel’s exhortation, there was an attempt to convince the 
Jewish public that Israel was actually in a position of power in the region.  But these comments 
were always made behind closed doors and seemed to provoke incredulity among Jewish 
audiences.  As one shocked community center participant noted in response to a pedagogical 
attempt to talk her out of her sense of existential crisis: “They [unclear antecedent] are going to 
eat us.”  So more often than abandon their sense of Jews as an embattled and threatened 
population, many well-educated French Jews described simply turning away from mainstream 
media sources, cancelling newspaper subscriptions, relying on Jewish internet sources, and 
refusing (so they said) to even try to talk politics with French non-Jews.  Jews therefore found 
the content of a leaked policy letter from Socialist Party advisor Pascale Boniface to sitting 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin both scandalous and unsurprising; the letter, which never became 
the foundation of a formal policy, seemed to urge the Socialist Party to favor the Palestinian 
cause because there were more Muslims than Jews in France.30   
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  See	  further,	  Esther	  Benbassa,	  La	  République	  face	  à	  ses	  minorités:	  les	  juifs	  hier,	  les	  musulmans	  aujourd’hui	  (Paris:	  Mille	  et	  une	  nuits,	  2004);	  Matti	  Bunzl,	  Anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  Islamophobia:	  Hatreds	  Old	  and	  New	  in	  Europe	  (Chicago:	  Prickly	  Paradigm	  Press,	  2007).	  30	  Jean-­‐Dominique	  Merchet,	  “Israël	  fait	  claquer	  la	  porte	  du	  PS,”	  Libération,	  July	  18,	  2003.	  
This suggests that in the mid-2000s, Jews were increasingly telling a story about the 
experiential disconnect between their Jewishness and their Frenchness that was most visible, if 
not entirely rooted in, their sense that “the French” either could not or would not understand the 
real relations of domination that marginalized and endangered both French Jews and Israel, 
relations of domination that were often described in stark, Holocaust-like terms.  And this story 
was not altered in the slightest by increased government attention to anti-Semitism by the mid-
2000s.  The head of youth programing at the Fonds Social Juif Unifié, an Algerian-born Jew with 
a very firm and deep commitment to French republicanism, told me in 2005:  
I’ve had the sentiment myself [of not being able to be both Jewish and French]…  
It’s true that there are lots of things that have changed [for the better] in relation to 
anti-Judaism with this [change from Jospin to center-right Prime Minister Jean-
Pierre Raffarin] government… I’ve also had the sentiment, at the beginning of the 
anti-Semitic acts and over the course of two years, when we heard the media, the 
people in government etc. etc. talk.  When we heard the Minister of the Interior 
say that nothing was happening, nothing happened, when we felt the anti-Semitic 
attacks, the attacks in the street etc.  It’s not surprising to say, and I tell you once 
again that I had this impression, ultimately I said to myself, it’s that they don’t 
want Jews in France.  In the raw state, I don’t know if you were in France at the 
time, you had to see what happened.  It was hundreds of acts a day in the metro 
etc. that were never on the front page of newspapers.  We can say to ourselves 
when it happens to that point that ultimately it’s a country that doesn’t want its 
Jews.  If they don’t want me, why would I attach myself to a French identity?... 
It’s not the sentiment that was traditionally the sentiment of the Jewish 
community in France, which once again is a community that is very integrated.   
 
In other words, long after the government began denouncing anti-Semitic attacks (even in cases 
where they turned out to be hoaxes)31 many of my French Jewish informants thought both 
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  I	  am	  thinking	  here	  of	  the	  infamous	  case	  of	  the	  RER	  D.	  	  In	  2004,	  a	  young	  woman	  identified	  only	  as	  Marie	  L.	  told	  police	  officers	  that	  she	  and	  her	  baby	  had	  been	  showered	  with	  anti-­‐Semitic	  insults,	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  In	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  harm	  her	  and	  her	  baby	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  a	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  to	  help.	  	  The	  story,	  which	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  completely	  false,	  provoked	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  outrage.	  	  It	  also	  mobilized	  many	  of	  the	  tropes	  associated	  with	  the	  “new”	  anti-­‐Semitism:	  “Muslim”	  aggressors,	  pecuniary	  motives,	  and	  a	  completely	  indifferent	  “French”	  public.	  	  Solenn	  de	  Royer,	  “La	  fausse	  agression	  du	  RER	  D,”	  La	  Croix,	  July	  14,	  2004.	  
politicians and the wider public were incapable of hearing or understanding Jewish concerns 
about either Israel or “Muslims.”    
 
Anti-Semitism and Terrorism post-2012 
Publicly, Jewish writers and intellectuals figured the attacks against the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo and the kosher market Hyper Cacher in January 2015—as well as the 
attacks that followed in Paris in November 2015 and in Nice in July 2016—as a particularly 
deadly continuation and confirmation of earlier trends.  I would like to suggest, however, that 
they are part of a different kind of anti-Semitism, one that first showed its colors in 2012 in 
France.  As I have already suggested, French Jewish discourses about anti-Semitism do not 
emphasize the discontinuity between anti-Semitism in the early 2000s and in the second decade 
of the new millennium.  Quite the opposite.  The 2006 torture and murder of Ilan Halimi by the 
“Barbarian Gang” is often cited as proof that there is in fact no real difference between anti-
Semitism motivated by economic resentments and murderous, Islamically-inspired anti-
Jewishness.32  Halimi—a young cellphone salesman of North African origin—was kidnapped, 
held for ransom, and tortured by a Muslim man of Ivorian origin (Youssouf Fofana) and a large 
group of accomplices for 24 days.  Many of Fofana’s accomplices were identified as “Muslim.”33  
When it became clear to Fofana that no ransom would be forthcoming, Halimi was left by the 
side of the road to die.  This is a horrendously brutal and very obviously anti-Semitic story.  But 
it is unclear that radical Islam played a major role in Fofana’s depravity and/or in the vicious 
inhumanity of his accomplices.  Since his arrest and incarceration, Fofana has emphasized his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Delphine	  Mallevoüe	  and	  Anne	  Jouan,	  “Ilan	  Halimi :	  quand	  son	  bourreau	  devient	  un	  islamiste	  radical,”	  Le	  
Figaro,	  February	  13,	  2016.	  33	  I	  put	  “Muslim”	  in	  scare	  quotes	  here	  because	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  this	  means	  that	  they	  were	  second	  or	  third	  generation	  immigrants	  from	  Muslim	  countries	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  practicing	  Muslims.	  
religious attachments.  He cried “Allahu Akbar” at the opening of his trial and, according to 
recent newspaper reports, has become increasingly radicalized in prison.34  But prior to 
kidnapping Halimi, Fofana had a long history of attempting to kidnap and ransom important or 
wealthy individuals.35  It is thus not fully clear that Halimi’s murder served either an Islamist or a 
symbolic function; rather, Fofana seemed to have assumed in classic European anti-Semitic 
fashion that Jewishness meant wealth.  In keeping with that, he attacked a Jew who worked in a 
field closely associated with visible and attractive wealth in the France of the mid-2000s; 
cellphones—as many of my interlocutors told me over and over again—were reputed to be the 
most frequently stolen items of the period.  
In some ways, Fofana was the horrible apotheosis of the often theft-related, youth-on-
youth anti-Semitism that characterized the early 2000s.  And while this anti-Semitism still exists, 
it has been overshadowed by the growth of a far more spectacular and murderous Islamist 
variety.  The beginning of this shift was signaled by Mohammed Merah’s attacks in Montauban 
and Toulouse in 2012.  Merah claimed affiliation with Al-Qaeda and Islamist jihad as a way of 
justifying lethal attacks against three French soldiers, as well as parents and children at a Jewish 
school.  These attacks had absolutely no pecuniary or pragmatic motive; they were instead 
viciously symbolic. Both attacks performatively and discursively linked Jews as targets with 
other institutions and groups seen as antithetical to Islamist interests.  For the first time, Jews and 
republican soldiers (one of whom was Muslim) were seemingly interchangeable targets of 
Islamist rage.   
The same can be said for the subsequent attacks against Charlie Hebdo and Hyper 
Cacher.  Once again, an explicit tie to Islamism and international terror was used as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Mallevoüe	  and	  Jouan,	  “Ilan	  Halimi :	  quand	  son	  bourreau	  devient	  un	  islamiste	  radical.”	  35	  Agence	  France	  Presse,	  “Youssouf	  Fofana	  à	  nouveau	  condamné,”	  Le	  Monde,	  January	  12,	  2017;	  Stéphane	  Durand-­‐Souffland,	  “Dix	  ans	  de	  prison	  supplémentaires	  pour	  Youssouf	  Fofana,”	  Le	  Figaro,	  January	  11,	  2017.	  
justification for the attacks.  And the terrorists saw an internal logic between attacking an 
offensive, militantly secular journal that had been long known to insult religious believers of all 
kinds 36 and an institution that—however diverse its actual clientele and employees 37—seemed 
to stand as a public face for Jewishness.  These attacks, therefore, foregrounded Islamist 
motivations.  In addition, the symbolic links between Jews and various French national 
institutions (the military, the secular press) were clearly apparent.  The November 2015 attacks 
were in some ways the culmination of this shift.  Those attacks, which happened on a Friday 
night and targeted patrons at restaurants, a concert hall, and even in a sports arena, were probably 
not designed with Jews (particularly religious Jews) in mind.  Instead, in the name of radical 
Islam, they seemed to target “French society” in its consumerist and pleasure-seeking forms.  
Jews were here simply a subset of a larger French social and political order. 
 There is little that directly links the kind of anti-Semitism young Jews recounted in the 
early 2000s with the explicitly Islamist attacks I just described.  In fact, mid-2000s, street corner 
anti-Semitism, like the violent protests that wracked suburban French neighborhoods for weeks 
in 2005, may have been more likely to originate with youth estranged from Islam rather than 
with those close ties to religious practice and/or mosque communities.38  In other words, a 
narrative that insists on the continuity between the anti-Semitism of the early 2000s and the 
Islamist attacks that started in 2012 may conceal major sociological and political shifts that have 
occurred with the increasing stigmatization of Islam in France, as well as with the rise of the 
Islamic State and the failure of the Arab Spring.  But insisting discursively on the continuity in 	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  Sandrine	  Sanos,	  “Jews	  and	  Muslims	  in	  France	  before	  and	  after	  Charlie	  Hebdo”	  (Association	  for	  Jewish	  Studies,	  Boston,	  December	  13,	  2015).	  37	  Ethan	  Katz,	  “The	  Multi-­‐Ethnic	  France	  That	  Is	  Under	  Attack,”	  Marginalia	  Review	  of	  Books,	  February	  17,	  2015.	  38	  Anne-­‐Marie	  Ladoues,	  “Banlieues :	  des	  jeunes,	  sans	  visages,	  refusant	  le	  modèle	  social	  français,”	  Le	  Monde,	  November	  8,	  2005;	  Olivia	  Recasens,	  Christophe	  Labbé,	  and	  Jean-­‐Michel	  Décugis,	  “UOIF:	  La	  fatwa	  anti-­‐casseurs,”	  Le	  Point,	  November	  16,	  2005;	  Yves	  Bordenave	  and	  Stéphanie	  Le	  Bars,	  “Samedi	  21	  juin,	  Rudy	  H,	  17	  ans,	  a	  été	  tabassé	  et	  est	  resté	  dans	  le	  coma	  près	  de	  48	  heures,”	  Le	  Monde,	  June	  25,	  2008.	  




the kinds of acts and motivations that count as “anti-Semitic” does something important.  It 
allows French Jews to argue against colonial and postcolonial readings of anti-Semitism without 
jeopardizing Jewish Frenchness.  This can be seen most clearly in ways that new French Jewish 
discourses emphasize the link between anti-Semitic attacks and Israel. 
As noted above, in the early 2000s, both Jews and non-Jews saw Israel as sign and agent 
of the moral disconnect between Jews and the rest of French society.  Not only did the Jews I got 
to know feel like Israel divided them from “Arabs” or “Muslims,” but they also saw their support 
for the Jewish state as incomprehensible to the rest of French society.  But by the ‘teens, shared 
French and Israeli experiences with “Islamic” terrorism had become a leitmotif of Jewish press 
communiqués.   These communiqués emphasized two things.  First, the identity of “Islamic” 
attacks against civilians and soldiers in Israel and those against civilians in places as diverse as 
France, Iraq, and the United States.  And second, Israel’s role as a model of how to deal with 
“Islamic” terrorism in a liberal democratic context.  Here I just want to offer a few examples that 
illustrate these commonalities.  Following the November 13th attacks, Jacques Tarnero, a 
documentary film-maker well known in the French Jewish community for his criticisms of 
French media representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,39 wrote in the French edition of 
the Huffington Post an article entitled “Eyes Wide Open.”  In it, he argues:40   
As long as the targets were Israelis and then Jews [more generally], people 
ultimately accepted it as a new reality.  A far away conflict was exporting its ill 
effects here…  Naming this reality… facing the “real” seemed too difficult for 
the prevailing orthodoxy…  Since then, things have changed…  No war can be 
won if we cannot indicate whom we are fighting.  No enemy can be defeated if 
we cannot name it…  This terrorism is Islamist.  It claims its Islamic roots 41. 
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  a	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  in	  which	  he	  sought	  to	  prove	  that	  Muhammed	  Al-­‐Dura,	  the	  Palestinian	  child	  supposedly	  killed	  by	  Israeli	  soldiers	  and	  used	  by	  the	  French	  media	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  Israeli	  aggression,	  was	  in	  fact	  still	  alive.	  	  40	  The	  essay	  was	  immediately	  circulated	  by	  the	  CRIF	  via	  email	  to	  newsletter	  subscribers.	  41	  “Les	  yeux	  grands	  ouverts,”	  The	  Huffington	  Post,	  December	  4,	  2015,	  French	  edition.	  
In other words, the Islamic roots of anti-Semitism and terrorism had been hidden as long as the 
attacks could be associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  But once non-Jews were being 
attacked by the same terrorists and for the same reasons, people’s “eyes had been opened” to the 
real roots of violence against Israelis and anti-Semitism in Europe.  Similarly, an Israeli army 
officer writing in the conservative weekly newspaper Actualité Juive after the November 13th 
attacks asked the French public to stop asking why.  “Don't look for an answer to the question: 
why France?...  Israel is also touched by Islamist terrorism, and we know very well that no 
explanations can legitimate the killing of women, children, and men.  Our fight is the same as 
that in Europe.  We know that, but Europeans don’t know it yet…” 42.  Again, this suggests that 
if French Jews have long identified religiously, ethnically, and politically with Israelis, 
Europeans will come to see that they too are far closer to Jews (whether European or Israeli) 
than they ever could be to Muslims (whether European or Palestinian).  In July 2016, when 
Francis Kalifat took over as president of the CRIF, he gave an interview with Actualité Juive in 
which he noted: “We have to explain to our compatriots as well as our political leaders that 
terrorism has no borders.  It’s the same terrorism that killed [Hallel] the young [Israeli] 
adolescent in his bed [in a West Bank settlement] and that killed the two police officers in 
Magnanville [France].43  If it strikes in Paris, Jerusalem, Bagdad, or Istanbul, we should fight 
terrorism in the same way with the same solidarity.” 44  Just a month earlier, following an attack 
on a café in Tel Aviv, the CRIF had formally issued a similar communiqué before any news 
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  Olivier	  Rafowicz,	  “Olivier	  Rafowicz:	  La	  France	  a	  été	  frappée	  au	  coeur,”	  Actualité	  Juive,	  December	  1,	  2015,	  sec.	  France.	  43	  This	  was	  a	  lone	  wolf	  attack	  against	  a	  police	  commissioner,	  his	  wife,	  and	  child	  (who	  was	  left	  alive,	  but	  was	  forced	  to	  watch	  his	  parents	  die).	  	  The	  attacker,	  Larossi	  Abballa,	  claimed	  to	  have	  pledged	  allegiance	  to	  the	  Islamic	  state	  Elise	  Vincent	  and	  Julia	  Pascual,	  “Ce	  que	  l’on	  sait	  du	  meurtre	  d’un	  couple	  de	  policiers	  dans	  les	  Yvelines,”	  Le	  Monde.fr,	  June	  13,	  2016,	  sec.	  Société..	  44	  Laëtitia	  Enriquez,	  “Francis	  Kalifat :	  'Tolérance	  zéro	  envers	  l’antisémitisme	  sous	  toutes	  ses	  formes",”	  
Actualité	  Juive,	  July	  11,	  2016.	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agency had identified the motives of the attackers: “The CRIF is horrified by the attack last 
night in Tel Aviv.  For the CRIF, it is the same fanatical terrorism that attacks all democracies, 
as well as the signs and values associated with freedom.”45   
 In these accounts, the presentation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is transformed.  No 
longer a political struggle over territory and power that requires re-tooling how the French 
understand the (dis)advantage of Israeli Jews, it has been transformed into ground zero of a 
civilizational conflict that pits the democratic Western world against rising Islamism.  In fact, it’s 
no longer about either Israel or Palestine at all.  “Palestinians” are here transformed into what 
Naomi Davidson has called “only Muslims,” and Israelis stand as tokens for Western 
civilization.46   And this is the case, as suggested above, even when the person targeted happens 
to be a Jewish Israeli living in a West Bank settlement.  In other words, this presentation of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict evacuates all politics and thus colonial questions about power and 
control, leaving in their place a vision of naked and insatiable “Muslim” hatred that must be 
combated at all cost.  This, at least in theory, should allow French Jews to continue to support 
Israel without risking political “denationalization.”  It also works to displace questions about 
relative power between minority French communities in relation to anti-Semitism.  On the scale 
of global civilizational confrontations, Muslims cannot figure as a disadvantaged national 
minority, but rather as a global plurality with the potential to dominate vast swaths of the globe.  
Similarly, in this particularly reading of global conflict, Jews are neither dominant nor 
dominated; instead, they are tokens of Western civilization itself. 
 What remains very unclear is whether this discursive attempt to reposition Israel by 
eliminating (post)colonial accounts of contemporary political impasses will convince either 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  CRIF,	  “Communiqué	  de	  Presse,”	  June	  9,	  2016.	  46	  Only	  Muslim:	  Embodying	  Islam	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  France	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2012).	  
Jews or non-Jews.  It is certainly already being contested among Jews for the way it 
universalizes the experience of “Muslim terrorism” and thereby ignores the specific dangers that 
Jews face, both inside and outside France.  The Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher killings 
resulted in massive demonstrations where people held signs proclaiming Je suis Charlie [I am 
Charlie], Je suis juif [I am Jewish], and Je suis policier [I am a policeman].  On one level, such 
protests seemed to suggest the de-ghettoization of the fight against anti-Semitism and the 
recognition of what French Jewish intellectuals like Alain Finkielkraut had argued in the mid-
2000s: anti-Semitism and anti-French (or even anti-Western) sentiment have the same roots and 
the same promoters.  But on another level, this outpouring of identification with Jewish victims 
was seen as too little, too late, and even as disingenuous.47  For example, in Le Figaro Gil 
Mihaely explained Jewish disappointment: 
Lots of French Jews feel very alone.  For example, after the attacks on the 7th, 
8th, and 9th [of January 2015], the leitmotif became liberty of expression; but that 
was not the common denominator among the victims: they were victims of 
terrorism.  Neither the Jews of Vincennes [at the kosher market] nor the police 
officer from Montrouge were sacrificed on the altar of liberty of expression.  For 
Montrouge, it was probably a botched attack on a Jewish school; at Vincennes, it 
was a successful attack against a kosher market.  The attacks on [the Jewish 
school at] Toulouse and [the soldiers at] Montauban garnered far less of a reaction 
[than the Charlie Hebdo] attacks.  During the attacks against [the synagogue] at 
rue Copernic in 1981, the prime minister at the time, Raymond Barre, said: ‘this 
odious attack was directed against Israélites going to synagogue and killed 
innocent French people crossing the street.’  Today, there is a sense that this slip 
continues to reveal something deeply ingrained in the [French] collective 
unconscious: Jews are never innocent victims 48. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  way	  that	  the	  post-­‐Charlie	  Hebdo	  protests	  emphasized	  Jewish	  particularity	  and	  difference	  from	  France,	  see	  further	  Jessica	  Hammerschlag,	  “After	  Charlie	  Hebdo:	  The	  Representation	  of	  Jews	  and	  Muslims	  in	  France,”	  The	  Critique,	  January	  7,	  2016,	  http://www.thecritique.com/articles/after-­‐charlie-­‐hebdo-­‐the-­‐representation-­‐of-­‐jews-­‐and-­‐muslims-­‐in-­‐france/..	  	  My	  argument	  here	  is	  somewhat	  different—it	  is	  the	  failure	  to	  sufficiently	  recognize	  Jewish	  particularity	  in	  this	  story	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  bothered	  some	  Jews.	  48	  Anne-­‐Laure	  Debaecker,	  “Antisémitisme:	  les	  juifs	  sont-­‐ils	  les	  «parias	  de	  la	  République»?,”	  Le	  Figaro	  Online,	  January	  27,	  2015,	  sec.	  Vox	  Société,	  http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=5F5K-­‐HYT1-­‐JCJ6-­‐Y2J9&csi=5826&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true.	  
But even more than articulating Jewish disappointment, Mihaely also suggests that any attempt 
to disconnect terrorism from Jewish specificity misread and betray reality.  This outpouring of 
support is yet another way of disguising or ignoring unique Jewish vulnerability vis-à-vis both 
Muslim terrorism and French universalism.  Similarly, when a group of self-identified Muslims 
published an open letter in the Journal du Dimanche condemning Islamist terrorism, the CRIF 
immediately noted that Jewish victims had been left off the list, an “oversight” the CRIF thought 
was both “heavy with meaning” and “prevented people from understanding all the dimensions of 
the Islamist terrorism that confronts France today.”49  It is thus very hard for many French Jews 
to talk about contemporary Islamic terrorism without evoking Jews’ unique vulnerabilities vis-à-
vis Muslim persecutors.  This difficulty may explain, in part, the flourishing popular literature 
that emphasizes the ways in which dhimmitude—the historically and geographically variable, 
religiously-inspired framework for tolerating Christians and Jews in Islamic lands—was used to 
dominate, humiliate, and persecute North African Jews.50  Some French Jewish discourses may 
be attempts to replace this kind of colonially-inflected understanding of contemporary anti-
Semitism and terrorism.  But this particular vision of Muslim terrorism—one in which Jews are 
the first, most helpless, and least recognized victims—remains a powerful framework for 
understanding contemporary Jewish/Muslim relations, particularly among the North African 
Jews I got to know.  
It is equally unclear whether the wider French public has moved beyond a reading of the 
Middle Eastern conflict and/or domestic anti-Semitism through the lens of relative Jewish 
privilege.  The school teacher who blurted out that Jews needed to stop oppressing Palestinians 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  CRIF,	  “Communiqué	  de	  Presse.”	  50	  See	  for	  example,	  Nathan	  Weinstock,	  Histoire	  de	  chiens :	  La	  dhimmitude	  dans	  le	  conflit	  israélo-­‐palestinien	  (Paris:	  Mille	  et	  une	  nuits,	  2004);	  Bat	  Ye’or,	  “The	  Dhimmi	  Factor	  in	  the	  Exodus	  of	  Jews	  from	  Arab	  Countries,”	  in	  
The	  Modern	  Jewish	  Exodus	  from	  Arab	  Lands,	  ed.	  Malka	  Hillel	  Shulewitz	  (New	  York:	  Cassel,	  1999);	  Bat	  Ye’or,	  Le	  
dhimmi:	  profil	  de	  l’opprimé	  en	  Orient	  et	  en	  Afrique	  du	  nord	  depuis	  la	  conquête	  Arabe	  (Paris:	  Antropolos,	  1980).	  
clearly suggests quite the contrary.  And in terms of domestic anti-Semitism, the last presidential 
election was full of not-so-subtle hard left and right wing references to “old” European canards 
about Jewish economic and political power.  During the campaign, both the dissident leftist camp 
run by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the hard right party headed by Marine Le Pen continually 
suggested that the economically liberal, relative-outsider Emmanuel Macron was best understood 
as an agent of a powerful global banking industry, an industry indexed by the name of Macron’s 
previous employer, “Rothschild.”  Needless to say, the name “Rothschild” continues to conjure 
up images that hark back to late 19th and early 20th century assumptions about Jewish 
foreignness, global conspiracy, and power, all of which were assumed to be threats to the French 
“nation.”  In other words, in a moment of rising French nationalism and Euroscepticism, 
presumptions about Jewish “power” may continue to haunt and perhaps even threaten French 
Jews.  Jews may not, however, be threatened in precisely the ways that they most seem to fear.  
 
Conclusion  
I have suggested that while dramatic, public manifestations of anti-Semitism in France 
shifted considerably from the early 2000s to the period following Mohammed Merah’s 
murderous rampage, public Jewish arguments about the roots of anti-Semitism changed very 
little.  What did change was the way some French Jewish discourses worked to link Israel to 
France by suggesting that Jewish/Israeli experiences with terrorism and Palestinian politics in the 
Middle East were isomorphic with those of “the French” vis-à-vis “Muslims” in Europe.  In the 
early 2000s, the invocation of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in relation to anti-Semitism seemed 
inextricably linked to colonially-inflected power relations between Jews and Muslims in both 
France and the Middle East.  After 2012, however, it became slightly easier to link French anti-
Semitism to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict without raising the specter of unequal power 
relations.  As a result, French anti-Semitism and Palestinian attacks against Jewish Israelis began 
to be more insistently portrayed as part of a growing “clash of civilizations,”51 a clash that rolled 
Israelis, Jews, “the French,” and even Europeans more widely into a single camp violently 
threatened by “Muslims.”  But alternative discourses suggesting that Jews qua Jews are 
particularly and even uniquely threatened by Muslims continued to circulate, highlighting the 
continued power of a frame focused on questions of power and domination.   
All of these discourses about the nature and implications of French anti-Semitism are 
attempts to make claims about Jewish belonging in contemporary France.  They are really only 
secondarily about the actual empirical facts of violence against French Jews.  As David Feldman 
has suggested in another context,52 the “facts” themselves are in part built out of these discursive 
struggles over what belonging might mean for European Jews.  This is not, however, what most 
social scientists interested in anti-Semitism in contemporary Europe are talking about.  Instead, 
they tend to reproduce the same debates that Jews themselves are having by focusing almost 
exclusively on what they see as the “true” empirical foundations for anti-Semitism.  Among 
social scientists, there seem to be two basic approaches.53  The first focuses on what gets called 
“the new anti-Semitism” and fully embraces Jewish discourses about the Muslim threat.  This 
approach is highly critical of any work that attempts to explain “Muslim” anti-Semitism as a 
function of economic and political exclusion.54  And it often insists that the “real” threat to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntington,	  The	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations	  and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  World	  Order	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  2011).	  52	  David	  Feldman,	  “The	  Meanings	  of	  Anti-­‐Semitism”	  (Birkbeck,	  University	  of	  London,	  February	  13,	  2017),	  http://www.pearsinstitute.bbk.ac.uk/events/events-­‐calendar/the-­‐meanings-­‐of-­‐antisemitism/.	  53	  See	  further	  Bunzl,	  Anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  Islamophobia:	  Hatreds	  Old	  and	  New	  in	  Europe.	  	  54	  See	  for	  example,	  Brenner,	  France,	  prends	  garde	  de	  perdre	  ton	  âme;	  Brenner,	  Les	  territoires	  perdus	  de	  la	  
République:	  antisémitisme,	  racisme	  et	  sexisme	  en	  milieu	  scolaire;	  Richard	  Landes,	  “Secular	  Supersessionism	  and	  Post-­‐Christian	  Europe’s	  Tolerance	  for	  Anti-­‐Semitism,”	  in	  Measure	  of	  European	  Resilience:	  Anti-­‐Semitism(s)	  
Old	  and	  New	  (Council	  for	  European	  Studies,	  Philadelphia,	  2016);	  Taguieff,	  La	  nouvelle	  judéophobie;	  Trigano,	  




Ethan Katz  11/30/2017 1:20 PM
Formatted: French
Ethan Katz  11/30/2017 1:20 PM
Formatted: French
French and European Jews is no longer the far right, but rather a coalition of the supposedly 
“dominated,” namely leftists and Muslims.  The second social scientific approach is sometimes 
even critical of the term “new anti-Semitism.”55  It instead insists on the relative privilege of 
European Jews in both everyday socioeconomic terms and in relation to state discourses and 
practices that increasingly target Muslims while in fact making (more or less credible) overtures 
to a shared “Judeo-Christian” culture.  From this perspective, Jews are neither politically nor 
existentially threatened by “Muslim” anti-Semitism, which can be explained as a misguided way 
of protesting relative Jewish wealth and integration into European societies.  
Both of these positions are attempts to “objectively” discuss Jewish (lack of) safety and 
security in contemporary Europe.  And they completely miss one of the central points of this 
article.  To be sure, the causes and manifestations of anti-Jewish acts in France are constantly 
shifting and highly variable.  And this is a worthy topic of study.  The problem arises when 
researchers make such studies the blunt explanatory tool for how Jews experience and 
discuss their place in contemporary France.  Despite empirical shifts in anti-Semitic acts, French 
Jewish discourses suggest a relatively stable structure of feeling, one centered around fear of 
Muslim domination and abandonment by French society and the state.  It this disjuncture -- 
between a highly changeable empirical reality and relatively consistent, if nonetheless contested, 
contemporary discourses about anti-Semitism -- that is most interesting.  It suggests the need for 
a third approach to contemporary European anti-Semitism, one that we might call 
phenomenological.  Social scientists should start moving beyond an analysis of “anti-Semitism” 
itself and pay more attention to the cultural and affective work Jewish discourses about anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
La	  démission	  de	  la	  République.	  	  For	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  this	  “new	  anti-­‐Semitism,”	  see	  Judaken,	  “So	  What’s	  New?	  	  Rethinking	  the	  ‘New	  Antisemitism’	  in	  a	  Global	  Age.”	  55	  See	  for	  example,	  Benbassa,	  La	  république	  face	  à	  ses	  minorités;	  Bunzl,	  Anti-­‐Semitism	  and	  Islamophobia:	  
Hatreds	  Old	  and	  New	  in	  Europe;	  Daniel	  Lindenberg,	  Le	  rappel	  à	  l’ordre:	  enquête	  sur	  les	  nouveaux	  réactionnaires	  (Paris:	  Seuil,	  2002);	  Mandel,	  Muslims	  and	  Jews	  in	  France:	  History	  of	  a	  Conflict.	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Semitism do in any particular moment.  How are such discourses generated?  How do they 
circulate?  What understandings of Jewish belonging do they assume and help produce?  And 
what might the answers to these questions mean for understanding how Jews can and cannot 
think about their own futures in France and Europe more generally?  These are crucial questions 
because Jewish discourses about anti-Semitism highlight structures of feeling that cannot be 
reduced to empirical questions about (lack of) safety and security. Perhaps by paying attention to 
how and why contemporary anti-Semitism gets used to think through the problem of Jewish 
belonging, social scientists can begin to empathetically analyze, rather than simply echo or 
dismiss, Jewish discourses themselves.  
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